Compulsory medical intervention versus external constraint in pandemic control by Douglas, Thomas et al.
 1 
The Covid-19 Response in England: A Conditional, Comparative Argument 
for Compulsory Medical Intervention 
 
Thomas Douglas, Lisa Forsberg, and Jonathan Pugh 
 
[This is a pre-publication version of an article forthcoming in Journal of 
Medical Ethics. The final version will appear here: https://jme.bmj.com/.]  
 
 
Abstract. Would compulsory treatment or vaccination for Covid-19 be justified? 
In England, there would be significant legal barriers to it. However, we offer a 
conditional ethical argument in favour of allowing compulsory treatment and 
vaccination, drawing on an ethical comparison with external constraints—such 
as quarantine, isolation and ‘lockdown’—that have already been authorised to 
control the pandemic. We argue that, if the permissive English approach to 
external constraints for Covid-19 has been justified, then there is a case for a 
similarly permissive approach to compulsory medical interventions. 
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Governments worldwide have responded to the Covid-19 pandemic with sweeping 
constraints on freedom of movement and association, ranging from isolation of 
confirmed cases, to quarantine of individuals thought to have been exposed to the 
virus, to general lockdowns requiring all individuals to stay at home except for specified 
purposes.  
 
To guarantee the lawfulness of these measures, and others that might become 
necessary, governments have introduced a range of new legal instruments. But in many 
countries, one measure that these instruments leave off the table is the use of 
compulsory medical interventions—by which we mean physically invasive treatments 
or vaccinations. In the near-term future, the most pressing moral issue raised by newly 
developed vaccines for Covid-19 will likely concern fair distribution, since these 
vaccines will initially be a scarce resource.[1] However, once such vaccines or 
treatments for Covid-19 become widely available, there may be considerable political 
interest in enforcing their uptake, since this could allow for the quickest and safest 
route out of remaining ‘lockdown’ and distancing arrangements. In the case of vaccines, 
there will be a need to ensure that enough people are vaccinated to confer herd 
immunity. There may also be an argument for ensuring that people who have contact 
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with many others, such as teachers, retail staff and health care workers, are vaccinated 
without exception. In the case of treatments, we might hope that widespread use of 
anti-viral therapies could reduce the burden on health services by reducing the number 
of infected individuals who require intensive care. 
 
This raises the question: would compulsory medical intervention for Covid-19 be 
justified?1 In the first part of the article, we show that, in England,2 there would be 
significant legal barriers to the introduction of compulsory medical interventions for 
Covid-19. But in the second part, we present a conditional ethical case for seeking to 
overcome those barriers. We argue that, if the permissive English approach to external 
constraints for Covid-19 has been justified, there is at least a defeasible case for 
permitting some compulsory medical interventions. This is because, legal barriers 
aside, it is morally no harder to justify safe, effective and only moderately invasive 
compulsory medical interventions for Covid-19 than some of the external constraints 
that have already been authorised for the control of Covid-19 in England.  
 
BARRIERS TO COMPULSORY MEDICAL INTERVENTION FOR COVID-19 IN ENGLISH LAW 
 
In English law, the competent individual’s right to refuse any medical intervention 
that interferes with her body is well-established and enjoys strong protection. As we 
shall see, mental health law provides some exceptions to this right,3 but for most 
individuals who possess decision-making capacity, the right persists even when the 
individual’s reasons for refusing an intervention are bizarre, irrational, or non-existent, 
when undergoing the intervention would clearly be in her best interests, and indeed 
when refusing the intervention would certainly lead to her death.[8-11] 
 
Case law of the European Court of Human Rights suggests that the individual’s right 
to make her own medical decisions, and in particular to refuse interventions that 
interfere with her body, is within the ambit of the right to private life protected by 
article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). [12-14] The United 
Kingdom is party to the ECHR and has incorporated it into English law via the Human 
 
1 For discussion of what it means for a vaccination policy to be ‘compulsory’, see [2-5]. 
2 Health is in the United Kingdom a devolved matter, and England and Wales therefore have separate 
public health law— including infectious disease control—regimes. We therefore focus just on England 
here, even if many of our arguments may apply to the public health regimes in other jurisdictions in 
the United Kingdom and elsewhere. 
3 A patient’s consent will be valid when (i) she possesses decision-making capacity;[6] (ii) she possesses 
sufficient information about the intervention;[7] and (iii) her decision is not unduly influenced by 
external influences. [8] The only exception to this is individuals detained under mental health law, who 
may, when certain conditions are met, receive interventions without their consent even when they 
possess decision-making capacity. 
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Rights Act 1998. Any non-consensual medical intervention that interferes with 
recipients’ bodies would likely engage article 8 ECHR. In X v Austria, the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) held that ‘[c]ompulsory medical intervention, even 
if it is of minor importance, must be considered an interference with [article 8 
ECHR]’.[15]  
 
The protection that article 8 ECHR offers for individuals’ bodily integrity is not 
absolute, however. Interferences can be justified if they are in accordance with national 
law, pursue a legitimate aim, and are proportionate in relation to this aim. In the case 
of vaccinations or treatments intended to stem the spread of a pandemic disease, a 
legitimate aim is present; the ECtHR has previously accepted non-consensual blood 
tests, vaccinations, and screening programmes as justified on grounds of, inter alia, 
protection of the rights and freedoms of others,[15] and public safety.[16] But non-
consensual interventions that interfere with individuals’ bodily integrity may fail the 
proportionality test. One reason that they may do so is that other equally effective 
and less restrictive alternative measures may be available. Yet even if no other equally 
effective alternative measures exist, it might be argued that non-consensual medical 
interventions for Covid-19 would be disproportionate, for example, because the benefits 
are insufficiently important to justify the infringement of bodily integrity that they 
would entail.4 We shall challenge this view in the second half of this paper. 
 
Prior to the pandemic, English public health, like medical and human rights law, was 
not hospitable to compulsory medical intervention for pandemic control. Section 
45G(2) of the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984 (as amended by the Health 
and Social Care Act 2008) authorises a Justice of the Peace to order one or more of 11 
of restrictions of liberty on a potentially infectious person, when that is necessary to 
 
4 Whether a given measure is ‘necessary in a democratic society is determined by balancing the interests 
of the individual subjected to the measure against those of the Member State subjecting her to it. In 
order for an interference with individual rights to be ‘necessary’, there has to be a pressing social need 
for it. Member States are afforded a margin of appreciation in determining whether such a need exists, 
subject to review by the ECtHR. The Court will take into account factors such as the relevance and 
sufficiency of the reasons given by the Member State by way of justification.[17, 18] Proportionality is 
determined taking into account the legislative choices made and decision-making process followed by 
the Member State, the parliamentary and judicial reviews undertaken, and procedural safeguards 
available to individuals subjected to the measure. The Member State’s decision-making process in 
employing the measure must be fair and give due attention to the safeguarding of the article 8 interests 
of individuals subjected to it.[19] In the case of compulsory medical intervention for Covid-19, Member 
State’s interests in safeguarding the lives and health of others seem compelling, so give that sufficient 
safeguarding mechanisms were put in place, it does not seem unreasonable to assume that such 
interventions could be justified. It is also not obvious that the status quo approach would be accepted 
as proportionate. For an argument to the effect that the (pre-Covid-19) UK public health law framework 
‘fails to set out a clear and proportionate approach’ in respect of vaccination, see [2]. 
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remove or reduce the risk of their transmitting a pathogen that poses a significant 
harm to human health.[20] However, although the listed restrictions include the 
imposition of medical examination (s 45G(2)(a)) and monitoring (s 45G(2)(h)), they 
do not include physically invasive therapeutic or preventive interventions. 
 
Moreover, although Section 45C of the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984  
grants the Secretary of State the power to pass further domestic regulations deemed 
necessary to prevent the spread of an infectious disease,5 section 45E prohibits these 
regulations from including provisions to directly impose compulsory medical treatment 
(including vaccination) at a population level.6 
 
The powers that may be exercised in the interests of public health have, however, 
changed with the Coronavirus Act 2020.[22] This act extends the power to impose 
public health restrictions beyond Justices of the Peace to the relevant Secretary of 
State, and designated public health officers. Moreover, Schedule 21 of the Act explicitly 
authorises imposing invasive testing methods, including the withdrawal of blood 
samples and respiratory secretions for the purposes of screening and assessment. Like 
the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984, compulsory treatment is not included 
in the Coronavirus Act 2020 amongst the requirements that may be imposed in order 
to prevent the spread of infections. However, the Coronavirus Act 2020 is arguably 
more accommodating to the possibility that it could be. Whereas the Public Health 
(Control of Disease) Act 1984 states that a Justice of the Peace may impose ‘one or 
more of the following’ 11 restrictions listed in section 45G(2) (the list thus appearing 
to be exhaustive), Schedule 21, paragraph 14(1)-(2) of the Coronavirus Act 2020 
simply states that if screening confirms that an individual is infected with Coronavirus, 
public health officers may impose “such requirements and restrictions on the person 
as the officer considers necessary and proportionate”. This wording in the Coronavirus 
Act arguably leaves the door to compulsory medical interventions for Covid-19 
somewhat ajar.7  
 
 
5 This power was used recently to create [21], which preceded [22]. 
6 Notably though, this provision may not preclude the possibility that such regulations could authorise 
compulsory treatment on a case-by-case basis.[23] 
7 Paragraph 14(3) of the Coronavirus Act 2020 provides some examples of interventions that this may 
include, but there is no reason to think that this list is exhaustive. However, although compulsory 
treatment is neither expressly prohibited or permitted under the act, we believe that there are significant 
difficulties with interpreting the law as implicitly permitting compulsory treatment. Both the 
presumption of liberty in public law, and the fact that the Public Health Act prohibits compulsory 
treatment in future regulations authorised under its auspices, raise considerable obstacles for this 
interpretation. 
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However, before such interventions could be considered, the significant barriers posed 
by medical and human rights law would need to be overcome. In what follows, we 
present an ethical case for seeking to overcome those barriers.  
 
AN ETHICAL ARGUMENT FOR PERMITTING COMPULSORY MEDICAL INTERVENTION FOR 
COVID-19 
 
Ethicists have argued in favour of compulsory vaccination on diverse theoretical 
grounds, including by appealing to libertarian principles governing the imposition of 
unjust harm or risk of harm on others,[24] to collective self-defence,[25] and to moral 
duties of easy rescue or fairness.[26-28] However, such arguments will only receive as 
much support as the sometimes controversial moral theories underlying them. Thus, 
rather than invoking any of these particular principles or duties here, we instead offer 
an argument that we hope can be more broadly accepted. The argument has a 
conditional and comparative form. We will argue that compulsory medical 
interventions for the control of Covid-19 would be ethically preferable, or at least not 
dispreferable, to some forms of external constraint—such as quarantine, isolation or 
‘lockdown’—that English law already authorises for the same purpose. This implies 
that, if allowing these forms of external constraint has been justified, then there is a 
case (though not necessarily a decisive one) for allowing compulsory medical 
intervention as well.8  
 
We begin with a point about harm: at least for reasonably safe medical interventions—
interventions that can be expected to pose no greater risk of harm to the individual 
than typical, widely used treatments and vaccines—compulsory medical intervention 
is likely to impose no more (and perhaps substantially less) harm on those subjected 
to it than do the types of external constraints being deployed currently. Many of us 
would prefer to be required to undergo a safe treatment or vaccination to being 
subjected to constraints on movement for an extended period so, if wellbeing is 
determined by preference satisfaction, compulsory medical intervention would, for 
many of us, be less harmful than external constraint.  
 
Hedonistic understandings of wellbeing yield a similar result; mandating a safe 
treatment or vaccine could, for many people, be expected to cause less experiential 
suffering than severe constraints on movement. A recent evidence review suggests that 
quarantine is associated with significant negative psychological effects including post-
traumatic stress symptoms, confusion, and anger, and there is some evidence to suggest 
 
8 For similar arguments made in the context of criminal justice, see [29]. For the suggestion that such 
an argument might be made with respect to Covid-19, see [30, 31]. 
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that some of these effects can last for years after quarantine.[32] There have also been 
reports of increased rates of domestic abuse under lockdown arrangements.[33] By 
contrast, vaccinations typically have few side effects, and severe side effects are usually 
vanishingly rare.[34] It is, of course, quite likely that the first-developed treatments 
and vaccines for Covid-19 will be less safe than established vaccines, given the rapid 
development process. However, their safety might still be comparable to many widely 
used pharmaceutical interventions, which are often somewhat less safe than vaccines. 
Moreover, it is quite likely that early treatments for Covid-19 will be interventions 
that are already employed for other conditions, and whose general safety is well 
established. It might be argued that, to the side-effects of medical interventions for 
Covid-19, we need to add the side-effects of making these interventions compulsory. 
Perhaps the compulsion involved in compulsory vaccination or treatment would cause 
significant distress. However, concerns about such distress could be avoided by 
exempting individuals with particularly strong objections from the requirement to 
undergo treatment or vaccination; we are not defending the view that compulsion 
should be universal.  
 
What, then, is the argument for thinking that compulsory medical interventions are 
more morally problematic than external constraints? The most promising argument, 
we think, appeals to the putative right to bodily integrity, understood as a right 
against (certain forms of) significant bodily interference. This right is normally 
understood to protect even against safe and beneficial forms of bodily interference, and 
this right is, many would claim, stronger—in the sense that it is typically harder to 
justify its infringement—than our rights to freedom of movement and association—
the rights imperilled by external constraint.  
 
But the view that the right to bodily integrity lies on a plane above rights to free 
movement and association can be challenged.[29] Dominant philosophical defences of 
the right to bodily integrity often appeal to the concept of the self or the person. For 
example, some see the right to bodily integrity as an implication of the right to self-
ownership: we own our selves, our selves include our bodies, therefore we own our 
bodies, and our property rights in our bodies include rights against interference by 
others.[35] Others see the right as an implication of our personal sovereignty—
understood on analogy with the sovereignty of a state over its territory.[36] One way 
to defend the special strength of the right to bodily integrity, then, would be to appeal 
to the close relationship between the body and the self or person. Some would say that 
we are our bodies—or at least, we share our physical boundaries with them.[37, 38] 
Others would deny this but nevertheless maintain that there is some special and close 
relationship between us—ourselves or our persons—and our bodies.[39]  
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Note, however, that there is also a special and close relationship between the self and 
one’s loved ones and the self and one’s immediate physical environment. Proponents 
of the extended mind thesis hold that our mind resides as much in external cognitive 
aids, such as our diaries, books and smartphones as in our brains.[40-42] This arguably 
implies that these external objects are part of our selves.9 But even those who deny 
that such objects are literally part of ourselves are likely to concede that our selves 
rely heavily on them. They are also likely to concede that our selves are highly 
dependent—for both their persistence and flourishing—on our closest social 
relationships. Indeed, there has been a prominent ‘relational turn’ in our understanding 
of both the self, and the concept of self-governance or autonomy in recent 
scholarship.[44, 45] 
 
Suppose that our closest relationships and surroundings are just as important to the 
self as our bodies. Suppose, moreover, that the importance of the body to the self is 
indeed what justifies the peculiar strength of the right to bodily integrity. Since our 
closest relationships and surroundings are severely affected by restrictions of freedom 
of movement and association, it may follow that our rights to freedom of movement 
and association are just as strong as the right to bodily integrity. 
 
However, even if this is incorrect—even if the right to bodily integrity is indeed 
stronger than rights to freedom of movement and association, in the sense that 
infringements of bodily integrity are normally harder to justify than restrictions on 
movement and association—it will not straightforwardly follow that medical 
interventions for the purpose of pandemic control are always harder to justify than 
external constraint for the same purpose. It is important to attend also to the nature 
and severity of a rights infringement. Both rights to bodily integrity and rights to free 
movement and association are plausibly graded rights, in the sense that they provide 
stronger protection against more severe interferences, and weaker protection against 
less severe interferences. Most of us would think, for example, that though non-sexual 
touching can infringe the right to bodily integrity, it typically involves a less serious 
infringement of the right, and is thus easier to justify, than a more severe interference, 
such as cutting a person with a knife. Similarly, most of us would think that a mild 
interference with freedom of movement and association, such as a probation order 
requiring a person to present to a probation office every month, is easier to justify 
than a severe interference, such as solitary confinement.  
 
This is relevant because at least some of the external constraints currently being 
lawfully employed to control the COVID-19 pandemic—such as isolation in a hospital 
facility—surely involve a very severe interference with freedom of movement and 
 
9 cf [43]. 
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association. On the other hand, requiring a person to receive a single vaccination by 
injection, say, would arguably involve only a moderate interference with bodily 
integrity. Thus, even if there are reasons to think that infringing bodily integrity is—
other things being equal—harder to justify than infringing freedom of movement and 
association, other things may not be equal. A difference in the typical strength of these 
rights might be outweighed by a difference in the severity of the interference that 
infringes them.10 
 
There is also a third and final difficulty faced by the appeal to bodily integrity. 
Someone might claim that, contra our first argument, the right to bodily integrity is 
stronger than rights to freedom of movement and association. Moreover, they might 
claim that the difference in strength is so great that even a moderate interference with 
bodily integrity is harder to justify than a severe interference with freedom of 
movement and association. However, this view would be difficult to square with 
English law on two types of bodily interference that are somewhat analogous to, though 
distinct from, compulsory treatment or vaccination for pandemic control.  
 
The first is law on medical testing for the purposes of pandemic control. As we 
explained above, the Coronavirus Act 2020 already allows compulsory testing for 
COVID-19, which is significantly invasive (it involves insertion of a swab into the 
throat). It is not clear that compulsory injection of a vaccine, say, would involve a 
substantially more severe bodily interference than such testing. True, the vaccination 
would introduce a biologically active agent that is then disseminated throughout body. 
But testing may need to be repeated, in the case of non-infected individuals many 
times, whereas vaccination would most likely be a one-off injection. Moreover, future 
testing could involve the withdrawal of blood samples and respiratory secretions.[22] 
The removal of such biological substances from the body might reasonably be thought 
as severe, as an instance of bodily interference, as introducing a tiny amount of vaccine. 
It might, of course, be argued that compulsory vaccination risks greater harm than 
mandatory testing; complications of vaccination, even if extremely rare, can lead to 
death. However, if risk of harm is the issue, then external constraint is yet harder to 
justify since, as noted above, the risks of harms it poses may be even greater, in terms 
of mental health effects, domestic abuse, and effects of avoidance to seek treatment for 
other medical conditions.[46] 
 
10 Also relevant here is the degree of compulsion or coercion involved. An interference with the body 
could be easier to justify than a constraint on free movement and association because, for example, 
there are more exception clauses allowing individuals to escape the former than the latter. We might 
imagine, for example, that individuals could be exempted from vaccination on religious grounds, though 
they could not be exempted from quarantine on the same grounds. We thank an anonymous reviewer 
for pressing us to consider this point. For a discussion of different public health mechanisms with 
different degrees of compulsion, see [2]. 
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A second area of English law that allows for significant interference with bodily 
integrity is mental health law. In England, the Mental Health Act 1983 (as amended 
by Mental Health Act 2007) allows both detention and certain forms of non-consensual 
treatment of individuals with mental disorders when (amongst other conditions) this 
is deemed necessary for the health or safety of the patient or for the protection of other 
persons, even if the individual has decision-making capacity.[47] Nonconsensual 
treatment of capacitous individuals under the Mental Health Act for the purposes of 
the protection of others is analogous to the case of compulsory medical intervention 
for pandemic control. The Mental Health Act does include significant restrictions on 
the use of compulsory treatment. For example, the  threat that the individual poses 
to others (or themselves) in the absence of treatment must be imminent, and the 
treatment must be appropriate to the patient’s condition.11 However, we see no reason 
why similar conditions could not be placed on—and quite commonly satisfied with 
respect to—compulsory medical intervention for pandemic control. It is thus difficult 
to see how the current approach to mental health—which places compulsory medical 
intervention and external constraint roughly on a par—could be reconciled with the 
strong preference given to external constraint in the case of pandemic control.  
 
Indeed, if anything, it might seem that considerations of harm suggest that we should 
be more willing to interfere with people’s bodies in the case of pandemic control than 
in mental health. The risk of extensive harm associated with not employing medical 
intervention in the case of Covid-19, for instance, is likely to be greater than in typical 
mental health cases. Consider that, prior to the lockdown, individuals with Covid-19 
were, on average, infecting at least 2 other people during their infectious period, with 
each of those individuals infecting the same number again, and so on.[48] With around 
seven days between becoming infected and one’s peak infectiousness to others, this 
means that a single infected individual might, over the course of, say, 10 weeks have 
led to the infection of over 1000 people,12 of whom somewhere between 2 and 20 would 
be expected to die of the disease.13 We do not know how these figures might change as 
lockdown and distancing rules are relaxed; presumably infection rates will be controlled 
to some extent by basic hygiene and any remaining distancing measures. Still, this 
back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that vaccinating a single individual with a 
 
11 Moreover, if three months or more have elapsed since the first occasion (in the period for which the 
patient is liable to be detained) when certain medical treatments have been administered to the patient 
(by any means for their mental disorder), the lawful non-consensual imposition of non-urgent treatment 
after that point will require approval from a second opinion appointed doctor (s 58(b). 
12 Each infected individual infects 2 others and that there are 10 cycles of infection within a 10 week 
period, one initially infected individual would lead to the infection of 210 = 1,024 people by the end of 
the period. 
13 Current estimates for the mortality rate of Covid-19 typically place it between 0.2% and 2%. 
 10 
particularly large number of contacts (a retail worker, say) might be expected to 
prevent several deaths over a relatively short period. It would also, of course, prevent 
significant morbidity since, in addition to the risk of death, Covid-19 carries risks of, 
for example, (potentially permanent) organ damage, the magnitude of which is yet 
unknown.[49, 50] Some individuals detained under mental health law might pose 
serious threats to others’ health, but risks of a similar magnitude to Covid-19 would 
be very rare. 
 
On the other hand, the harm associated with compulsory medical intervention in the 
case of vaccination for Covid-19 is likely to be less than in many mental health cases. 
Vaccination would most likely be a one-off intervention, and it is of a kind that many 
people routinely undergo voluntarily without giving the matter much thought. The 
same could not be said of some mental health treatments—such as lithium for bipolar 
disorder and anti-psychotics for schizophrenia—that are quite commonly imposed 
under mental health legislation. 
 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 
We have argued that compulsory medical intervention for the control Covid-19 would 
not be harder to justify, morally, than some forms of external constraint that are 
already being used, or have been authorised, for this same purpose.  
 
Our arguments invoked two chief values: harm, and bodily integrity. With respect to 
harm: compulsory medical interventions will typically be less harmful to those 
subjected to them than some of the external constraints currently being implemented 
in response to the Covid-19 pandemic. With respect to bodily integrity: in the first 
place, it is doubtful that the right to bodily integrity is any stronger than the rights 
to free movement and association engaged by external constraint; in the second place, 
free movement and association are severely constrained by measures such as 
quarantine and isolation, whereas compulsory vaccination or treatment would likely 
involve only a moderate interference with bodily integrity; and in the third place, the 
strong precedence given to bodily integrity in the case of treatments and vaccines for 
pandemic control is difficult to reconcile with existing law on testing for pandemic 
disease and on mental health treatments.   
 
What, practically speaking follows from our argument? One possibility is that nothing 
follows, since the law need not always reflect morality; there can be perfectly good 
pragmatic or political reasons for regulating one type of intervention more stringently 
than another, even though the interventions are similar in their moral justifiability. 
We take it, however, that there is at least a defeasible case in favour of laws that treat 
morally similar practices similarly. Thus, our argument implies that there is at least a 
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case for bringing law on external constraint for pandemic control and law on 
compulsory medical intervention for the same purpose into line. One way to do this, 
of course, would be to regulate the use of external constraints more stringently. 
Perhaps the law currently permits quarantine, isolation and lockdown too easily. But 
for those of us who find that hard to accept, the other possibility may be more 
attractive: perhaps current legal constraints on compulsory medical intervention ought 
to be loosened.14 
 
To be clear, if these constraints were indeed to be loosened, safeguards would need to 
be put in place to ensure that medical interventions are imposed only when safe, 
effective and necessary, and where the degree of physical invasion that they involve is 
not too great. In some cases, compulsory medical intervention might be unnecessary 
simply because there are means short of compulsion for ensuring that (a sufficient 
number of) people undergo the intervention. Vaccine certification might, for example, 
be sufficient.[52] Moreover, if compulsion were to be introduced, exceptions would need 
to be built in for those who are likely to suffer side effects, and—perhaps—for those 
who have strong moral objections or simply prefer to lower their risk to others through 
other means. Though we cannot defend it in full here, we think that one promising 
option would be for the government to offer the choice: ‘either have yourself 
vaccinated, or stay at home’. That would treat external constraint and medical 
intervention as on a par, while giving individuals greater freedom than in a situation 
where either external constraints or medical interventions are imposed.  
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